




































ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K i/4W





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2082-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 524
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ............
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WORST CASE IS VALVE DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VALVE IS
USED TO COMPLETE_ROSSFEED' LOSS OF ALL_DUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY
TO TALKBACKS TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS.





















NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 525
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W





NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]



















NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO wITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 527
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] ,
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA # : 05-6L-2090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 529
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K I/4W







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





















ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)
CP] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANcy WOULD _SULT IN LOSS OF DI___CT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDE_TIQNS. .....
NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSO_ANBE USED (REDUNDANTLY TO
TALKBACKS) TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SO_.TWARE DOES NQ_=_SE THESE TA_BAC_S_ .........PHYSICALLY CANNOT
DETERMINE VALVE CLOSURE VIA A PRESSURE SENSOR, EXCEPT DURING A
BURN. JUST CLOSING A TANK ISOLATION VALVE WILL NOT CAUSE A
PRESSURE DIFFERENCE JUST DOWNSTREAM (UNLESS BURNING OMS) SINCE

































ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]













ITEM: RESISTOR, I. 2K 2W





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS _HAT IBELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD _=_E CQNSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY T_S REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FUL_ C_SED OR OPEN. HO_R, NASA' S
SCEN_IO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT_ 3,1, 3.2,1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 533
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 534
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K I/4W




HDW/F_LTNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K I/4W





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-503
APPENDIX C

















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]



















] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2078-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 537
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS.
NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED (REDUNDANTLY TO
TALKBACKS) TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS. PHYSICALLY CANNOT
DETERMINE VALVE CLOSURE VIA A PRESSURE SENSOR, EXCEPT DURING A
BURN. JUST CLOSING A TANK ISOLATION VALVE WILL NOT CAUSE A
PRESSURE DIFFERENCE JUST DOWNSTREAM (UNLESS BURNING OMS) SINCE
THERE IS NO FLUID MOVEMENT. '








NASA FMEA #: 0B-6L-2083A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 538
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C _o_
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]i
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTI_O_-PO_R ON THE ASSOCiAT_ED VALVE(S)_ SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S















IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430













NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 539
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / 3 C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2082-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 540
ITS: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B C ..........
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






_COMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [



































ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2082-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 542
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )





















































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2083A-I
_NASA DATA; ......,_
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 544
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHENTHE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BEL_S RUPTURE IS
I_vANT.A_WS RUPTURE ANYTIME _POSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430



































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
C ]
C ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2082-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 546
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ...._ _±
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COSPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ] [ 3 [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [























































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-517
APPENDIX C





NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2078-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 550
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA _DATA = _ ....
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ 3_
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [


















































ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2078-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 552
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:_ _ _ .....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
S C ..............
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS". (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
C ]
C ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2078-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 554
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































RESISTOR, 5. IK I/4W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2078-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/_C A B C _
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2091-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 566
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K I/4W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [























ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2083-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 558
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.







NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 559
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
fOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA # : 05-6L-2091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 560
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IF] [P] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WORST CASE IS VALVE DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VALVE IS
USED TO COMPLETE CROSSFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY
TO TALKBACKS TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS.
SEE JSC 10588 PAGE 5-18.




















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2083-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 564
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K I/4W





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]







NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2082-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 568
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ]




[ ] [ ] *
[P] IX]
[N] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WORST CASE IS VALVE DEC_D FAILED CLOSED _ REDUNDANT VALVE IS
USED TO COMPLETE CROSSFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY
TO TALKBACKS T0--bETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS.

































ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079A-2
NASA DATA: ....
_BASELI_ [ ]_
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 570
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOTBE_IONS!D_D AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTI_ EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 571
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 572
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES _ACH FULL C_SEDQR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA' S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS _D VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430








































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2090-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 574
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K i/4W







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ! [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
0MS-575
NONE






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2078-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 576
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
















[ 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)
[p] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




LOSS OFALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOU_D BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS.
NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED (REDUNDANTLY TO
TALKBACKS) TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NO T USE THESE TA_BACKS. PHYSICALLY CANNOT
DETERMINE VALVE CLOSURE VIA A PRESSURE SENSOR, EXCEPT DURING A
BURN. JUST CLOSING A TANK ISOLATION VALVE WILL NOT CAUSE A
PRESSURE DIFFERENCE JUST DOWNSTREAM (UNLESS BURNING OMS) SINCE






















NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 577
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W





NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]







NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 578
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K i/4W




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 579
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K i/4W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)


























NEW [ X ]







NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA RECO_NDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTI_TES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE _CO_INUOUS PO_R oN THE ASSOCIATED VALVE (S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTI_ EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430



















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 581
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 582
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K I/4W






A B C -::_::: _
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.






























ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K i/4W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] C ]
C 3 /2R ] C F ]
[ ] C ]
CP] CP]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]













ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
7 7
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C :_77_-
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDE_TIONS. =
NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED (REDUNDANTLY TO
TALKBACKS) TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
_LFUN_TIQN PROCS DO NOT MEN_TIONTHIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES N0T USE THESE TALKBACKS. PHYSICALLY C_0T
DETERMINE VALVE CLOSURE VIA A PRESSURE SENSOR, EXCEPT DURING A
BURN. JUST CLOSING A TANK ISOLATION VALVE WILL NOT CAUSE A
PRESSURE DIFFERENCE JUST DO, STREAM (UNLESS B_ING OMS) SINCE













































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
B_ELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ i_





[ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ACCORDING TO THE LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA _
SHOULD BE IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST, BUT IT IS NOT. IOA ASSUMES
THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS FMEA TO A NON-CIL SINCE IT DOES NOT
APPEAR IN THE NEW NAS A CIL LIST. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT NASA USE
THE PREVIOUS (LAST AVAILABLE TO IOA) CRITICALITY AND SCREENS








































ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430
SECT. 3.1, 3.2.1.2.9, 3.2.1.2.11.
_m






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 588
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





[P] IF] [ P] [X] *
[P] [P] [P] [ ]
[ ] [N] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY, SINC_ THE CR_ _GR_ES WITH
OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2008-2 (CAUSES CROSSI_EED VALVE TO FAIL
CLOSED). HOWEVER, NASA FAILED B SCREEN BECAUSE ONE OF THE TWO
POLES FAILING IS _DETE_ABLE. IOA BELIEVES THIS IS A CARRY-OVER
FROM WHEN NASA FAILED ONLY ONE CONTACT SET, AND RECOMMENDS _













....... _ =_ :
Z









NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2028-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 589
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




ACCORDING TO THE LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA
SHOULD BE IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST, BUT IT IS NOT. IOA ASSUMES
THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS FMEA TO A NON-CIL SINCE IT DOES NOT
APPEAR IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT NASA USE
THE PREVIOUS (LAST AVAILABLE TO IOA) CRITICALITY AND SCREENS
(3/IR PFP) AND REINSTATE THIS FMEA AS A CIL.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2028-3
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 590
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] ±
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOW_Si_LURE SHOULD NOT_!CO_SIDE_D_D
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA ISRIGHTT_T, IS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE _
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH _0THER FAILURE CONSISTi_G OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SPECS, "THE
MOTOR AND ACTUATION MECHANISM SHALL NOT FAIL AS A RESULT OF
PROLONGED POWER APPLICATION." SEE AC MOTOR VALVE SPEC MC284-0430





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2028-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 591
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY, SINCE THE CRIT AGREES WITH
OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2008-2 (CAUSES CROSSFEED VALVE TO FAIL
CLOSED). HOWEVER, NASA FAILED B SCREEN BECAUSE ONE OF THE TWO
POLES FAILING IS UNDETECTABLE. IOA BELIEVES THIS IS A CARRY-OVER
FROM WHEN NASA FAILED ONLY ONE CONTACT SET, AND RECOMMENDS
PASSING THIS B SCREEN.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2027-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 592
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT







NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ P ] [ NA]
[P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





[ P ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT NASA GENERATE A FMEA WITH THIS "STUCK IN OPEN
POSITION (BOTH CONTACT SETS)" FAILURE MODE. THE CLOSEST EXISTING
MATCH AVAILABLE IS NASA'S FMEA 05-6L-2027-I WITH A "FAILS TO
TRANSFER, FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO CONDUCT (ONE CONTACT SET)"
FAILURE MODE, WHICH IS ALREADY MATCHED TO MDAC-592 AND 595.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2027-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 594
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]


















[ ] [ N ]
_COMMENDATIONS :
[2/IR]
(If different from NASA) ..........
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA'S _COMMENDE_D CRITICAL IT_ _$i D_R_I_N _B_IOM_S HARDW.ARE__. FMEA 03-
3-2007-2' SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUS_}{E TANK ISOLATibN_giLVE TO
FAIL CLOSED. ALSO, NASA FAILED ONLY ONE POLE, CONSIDERING THE
OTHER POLE A S _DUNDANT, WHEREAS IOA CONSIDERED THE WORST CASE
FAILURE MODE BY FAILING A PART _COMMON TO BOTH PO_S (E.G. TOGGLE
LEVER). THIS IS THE REASON FOR IOA'S HIGHER CRITICALITY. NASA
CONSIDERED ONE POLE TO BE STANDBY REDUNDANT TO THE OTHER AND SO



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2027-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 595
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]












ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FU_C A B C
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
] C ] C ] C ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
]
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT NASA GENERATE A FMEA WITH THIS "STUCK IN OPEN
PosITION (BOTH CONTACT S_TS)_ _L_ I_D_E -. THE CLOSEST-EXISTiNG
MATCH AVAILAB_ IS NASA'S FMEA 05-6L_2027-I WITH A "FAILS TO
TRANSFER, FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO CONDUCT (ONE CONTACT SET)"






































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-
3-2007-2, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE TO
FAIL CLOSED. ALSO, NASA FAILED ONLY ONE POLE, CONSIDERING THE
OTHER POLE AS REDUNDANT, WHEREAS IOA CONSIDERED THE WORST CASE
FAILURE MODE BY FAILING A PART COMMON TO BOTH POLES (E.G. TOGGLE
LEVER). THIS IS THE REASON FOR IOA'S HIGHER CRITICALITY. NASA
CONSIDERED ONE POLE TO BE STANDBY REDUNDANT TO THE OTHER AND SO
HAD "NOT APPLICABLE" FOR B SCREEN.
w






NASA _A #: 05-6L-2011-I
NASA DATA:













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
C ] [ ] C ]
C ] [ ] C ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2011-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]
OMS .....
600
INDICATOR, POSITION BARBERPOLE TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT _ ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WORST CASE IS VALVE DECLARED FAILED CLOSEDAND REDUNDANT VALVE IS
USED TO COMPLETE CROSSFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY coULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION_ NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY
TO TALKBACKS TO DETERMINE VALVE P0_I_ION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS.

























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





NEW [ X ]
OMS
601
INDICATOR, POSITION BARBERPOLE TALKBACK
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[P] CP] CP]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WORST CASE IS VALVE DECLARED FAILED CLOSED AND REDUNDANT VALVE IS
USED TO COMPLETE CROSSFEED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN FALSELY FAILING THE CROSSFEED SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION. NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY
TO TALKBACKS TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS.
SEE JSC 10588 PAGE 5-18, AND MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE RCS 103A.





ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/8_ 8
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-602
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2151-I
NASA DATA: ..........
_LINE [ ]..........






INDICATOR, POSITION BARBERPOLE TALKBACK








NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] . [_ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TAL__BAC--K_TO-CREW. WORST ¢AS_ WOULD BE FAoLSELY F_AILI_NG T_E A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF M ISSIQN DUE TO SAFETy
CONS__I DERATIONS.
NASA WOULD BE R_ IF SE_SO_>3 B_ USEb_(_DU_D_£Y TO
TALEBACKS)TO DETERMINEVALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHTAND
_LFUNCTI.QN PROCS _ NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER .....
SOFTWARE__ DQ__ES NQT=USE_ THESE TA_LKBACKS- _P_HY .Si CALL .YCAN.T - _
DETERMINE VALVE CLOSURE VIA A PRESSURE SENSOR, EXCEPT DURING A
BURN. JUST CLOSING A TANK ISOLATION VALVE WILL NOT CAUSE A
PRESSURE DIFFERENCE JUST DOWNSTREAM (UNLESS BURNING OMS) SINCE






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2151-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INDICATOR, POSITION BARBERPOLE TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE
TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B
VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS.
NASA WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED (REDUNDANTLY TO
TALKBACKS) TO DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND
MALFUNCTION PROCS DO NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER
SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE THESE TALKBACKS. PHYSICALLY CANNOT
DETERMINE VALVE CLOSURE VIA A PRESSURE SENSOR, EXCEPT DURING A
BURN. JUST CLOSING A TANK ISOLATION VALVE WILL NOT CAUSE A
PRESSURE DIFFERENCE JUST DOWNSTREAM (UNLESS BURNING OMS) SINCE
THERE IS NO FLUID MOVEMENT.







NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
B_ELINE [ ]






METER, FRCS/OMS KIT PRESS_




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IDA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




........................IDA RECOMMENDS THAT NASA NOT_....._'_DEI_TE.................__HIS FMEA_.....05-6L-2!57'I._T_HIS
ITEM IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FLIGHT-DEPENDENT KIT, BUT A_&
DISP_YS FORWARD RCS_ OMS TANK PRESSURES WHICH ARE NOT FLIGHT-
DEPENDENT. IDA ALSO RECOMMENDS A CRIT UPGRADE FROM NASA' S_z_i_QL
ORIGINAL 3/3 TO _2_2;_,2_ECAUSE FA_LSE _Di_ATIONS_=_O_- TANK
PRESSURE GIVING AN APPEARANCE OF A LEAK COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2155-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






METER, LT OMS/RCS PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IN PRELAUNCH AND ONORBIT PHASES WOULD
RESULT IN LEFT RCS HELIUM TANK BEING DECLARED FAILED RESULTING IN
A LOSS OF DELTA VELOCITY AND LOSS OF MISSION CAPABILITY (SEE
FLIGHT RULE 6-41), UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE IS DETERMINED. NASA
WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY TO TALKBACKS TO
DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND MALFUNCTION PROCS DO
NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE
THESE TALKBACKS. PHYSICALLY CANNOT DETERMINE VALVE CLOSURE VIA
PRESSURE SENSOR, EXCEPT DURING A BURN. JUST CLOSING TANK
ISOLATION VALVE WILL NOT CAUSE A PRESSURE DIFFERENCE JUST
DOWNSTREAM (UNLESS BURNING OMS) SINCE NO FLUID MOVEMENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULE 6-41.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2158-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






METER, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









C ] [ ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
(If different from NASA)










































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2155-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






METER, RT OMS/RCS PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IN PRELAUNCH AND ONORBIT PHASES WOULD
RESULT IN LEFT RCS HELIUM TANK BEING DECLARED FAILED RESULTING IN
A LOSS OF DELTA VELOCITY AND LOSS OF MISSION CAPABILITY (SEE
FLIGHT RULE 6-41), UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE IS DETERMINED. NASA
WOULD BE RIGHT IF SENSORS CAN BE USED REDUNDANTLY TO TALKBACKS TO
DETERMINE VALVE POSITION. BUT FLIGHT AND MALFUNCTION PROCS DO
NOT MENTION THIS AND OMS FIRING SEQUENCER SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE
THESE TALKBACKS. PHYSICALLY CANNOT DETERMINE VALVE CLOSURE VIA
PRESSURE SENSOR, EXCEPT DURING A BURN. JUST CLOSING TANK
ISOLATION VALVE WILL NOT CAUSE A PRESSURE DIFFERENCE JUST
DOWNSTREAM (UNLESS BURNING OMS) SINCE NO FLUID MOVEMENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULE 6-41.







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS FUEL TANK ULLAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SENSOR PRESSURE, OX TANK ULLAGE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NEW [ X ]
OMS -
610
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, FUEL TANK LOWER




HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IN THE LIFTOFF PHASE. _A _EMPE_R_
SENSOR FAILURE COULD LEAD TO WRONGLY FAILING _ O_
PROPELLANT TANK LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SHALLOW ATO
BEFORE SENSOR FAILURE IS DETERMINED. NO REDUNDANCY AND MISSION
LOSS IMPLIES A CRIT OF 2/2.













































SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OX LOWER TANK
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IN THE LIFTOFF PHASE. A TEMPERATURE
SENSOR FAILURE COULD LEAD TO WRONGLY FAILING THE OMS FUEL
PROPELLANT TANK LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SHALLOW ATO
BEFORE SENSOR FAILURE IS DETERMINED. NO REDUNDANCY AND MISSION
LOSS IMPLIES A CRIT OF 2/2.
SEE JSC 20923 PCN-I AND FLIGHT RULE 6-2 THEN 6-40K.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2034-1
NASA DATA:
_ BASE_i_ [_ ]






SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PRESS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ ] *
IOA [ ]
[313 ] [ 3
[312R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA DOES, BUT NASA DOES NOT, IMPLY THAT CRT DISPLAYS AND MISSION
CONTROL CENTER ARE REDUNDANT TO ITEM TO GET OMS RIGHT AND LEFT
PROPELLANT ULLAGE, (AND RCS R/L/FWD PROP ULLAGE AND RCS R/L/FWD
HE TANK PRESSURE) MEASUREMENTS. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAN RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY REASONS SINCE THE ACTUAL STATUS OF THE

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
NASA DATA:
B_rLrm_ [ ]











[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2261-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2261-I
NASA DATA: .........
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /iR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]












[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2261-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



















LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA: r
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ..... ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] C ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2209-I















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
















































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



























NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2209-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]





[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM





(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]















[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2207-I
NASA DATA:
B_ELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2207-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: - 629
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2207-I
NASA DATA"
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2207-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2206-I
NASA_DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2206-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT, SO NOT DETECTABLE, EXCEPT FOR AN MDM
VALVE POSITION SIGNAL. BUT SINCE FSSRS DID NOT MENTION THAT
SIGNAL, IOA ASSUMED SOFTWARE DOES NOT USE IT TO DETECT VALVE
STUCK OPEN.













ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /ZR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA DATA: , .
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)








































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2206-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )














ASSESSMENT DAT : i/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-641
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2206-2
_ASA DATA:_ i
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT, SO NOT DETECTABLE, EXCEPT FOR AN MDM
VALVE POSITION SIGNAL. BUT SINCE FSSRS DID NOT MENTION THAT

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]






w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2208-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C :_
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ / ] [ ] [N] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA # : 05-6L-2007-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2007-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA D_ATA:
BASELINE [ _ ]_ _










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
I0A [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2015-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C_
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]

























] [ ] .
] C ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2087-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 653
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] [ ] [
] [ ] [
] [ ] [
NASA DAT_;
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2087-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 654
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] [ ] •
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2087-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 655
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]_
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2087-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 656
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2087-1
NASA DATA: .....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 657
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2086-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 658
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[
[
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2109-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 660
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] C ] *
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W




HDW/_mC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2086-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 662
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W







[3/3 ] [ ] [ ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2086-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 664
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RED_DANCY SCREENS
A B















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) __DE_UATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2086-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 665
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
































NEW [ X ]
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
















































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] [ ] ,
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2086-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 670
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2086-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 671
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W






HDW/FUNC A B C
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [
[313 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] C ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














ASSESSMENT DATE _ 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-672
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENGINE ARM/PRESS (C3AI, SI/$2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ? ] [ ? ] [ ? ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE B SCREEN, AND THUS UPGRADING TO A CiL,
SINCE .....THISFAILURE IS NOT DETECTAB_ EXCEPT DURING AN OMS BURN,
WHICH COULD BE TOO LATE. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING BOTH
CONTACT SETS IN THE FAILURE MODE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY, SINCE IT AGREES INDIRECTLY WITH OMS HARDWARE FMEA
03-3-4001-1. THIS NASA FMEA'S _D_DANCY SCREENS WERE MISSING
FROM THE LATEST AVAILABLE NASA REPORT. SINCE THIS FMEA DID NOT
APPEAR IN NASA'S NEW CIL PACKAGE, IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA PASSED




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENGINE ARM/PRESS (C3A1, $1/$2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ? ] [ ? ] [ ? ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE B SCREEN, AND THUS UPGRADING TO A CIL,
SINCE THIS FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE EXCEPT DURING AN OMS BURN,
WHICH COULD BE TOO LATE. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING BOTH
CONTACT SETS IN THE FAILURE MODE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S
CRITICALITY, SINCE IT AGREES INDIRECTLY WITH OMS HARDWARE FMEA
03-3-4001-1. THIS NASA FMEA'S REDUNDANCY SCREENS WERE MISSING
FROM THE LATEST AVAILABLE NASA REPORT. SINCE THIS FMEA DID NOT
APPEAR IN NASA'S NEW CIL PACKAGE, IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA PASSED
ALL OF THE SCREENS.
w
















SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENGINE ARM/PRESS (C3AI, SI/$2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENGINE CONTROL VLV





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2030-2
NASA DATA: _
B_ELINE [ ]






SWITCH, OMS LT/RT ENGINE CQ_OL VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE B SCREEN AND CONSIDERING BOTH POLES IN
THE FAILURE MODE. NASA FAILED ONLY ONE POLE, CONSIDERING THE
OTHER POLE AS REDUNDANT, WHEREAS IOA CONSIDERED THE WORST CASE
FAILURE MODE BY FAILING A PART COMMON TO BOTH POLES (E.G. TOGGLE
LEVER). NASA CONSIDERED ONE POLE TO BE STANDBY REDUNDANT TO THE
OTHER AND SO HAD "NOT APPLICABLE" FOR B SCREEN. IOA BELIEVES
FAILURE OF BOTH POLES WOULD NOT BE READILY DETECTABLE UNTIL IT IS
TOO LATE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY, SINCE NASA'S CRIT






































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]_ [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C





















































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] C ] *
] C ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)







































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2177-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2177-2
NASA DATA:
_BASELI_E[ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2177-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-651
mAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET _= m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-684
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2177-2
NASA DATA:
-BASELINE [_ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA INTO TWO FMEAS, SINCE THE FUSE
IN THE STANDBY CIRCUIT IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO THE FUSE IN THE
ACTIVE CIRCUIT, AND THEREFORE THEIR B SCREENS WILL DIFFER ("NA"
AND "P").
w
















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECO_NDS SPLITTING THIS _A I_O TWO _AS, SINCE TH_E_SE
IN_T_ STANDBY _RCUIT IS STANDBY-_DANT TO THE _SE IN _E


























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4581-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE PNEUMATIC PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IF LOSE ALL REDUNDANCY, THE REAL STATUS OF THE OMS ENGINE GASEOUS
NITROGEN TANK WILL BE UNAVAILABLE OR FALSELY INDICATED (LOSS OF
N2) AND CAN RESULT IN FALSELY FAILING TWO OMS GN2 TANKS LEAKING
OR FAILED, THEREFORE MISSION CAPABILITIES LOST OR ATO COULD BE
CALLED, IMPLYING CRIT 3/2R.
SEE FLIGHT RULE 6-40.





NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4581-1
NASA DATA- _
BASELINE [ ]







SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE PNEUMATIC PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IF LOSE ALL REDUNDANCY, THE REAL STATUS OF THE OMS ENGINE GASEOUS
NITROGEN TANK WILL BE UNAVAILABLE OR FALSELY INDICATED (LOSS OF
N2) AND CAN RESULT IN FALSELY FAILING TWO OMS GN2 TANKS LEAKING
OR FAILED, THEREFORE MISSION CAPABILITIES LOST OR ATO COULD BE
CALLED, IMPLYING CRIT 3/2R.































SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE REG OUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] C ] C ] [ x ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
W
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS GENERATING A FMEA FOR THIS ITEM. NASA HAS NO
APPARENT FMEA TO EXPLICITLY COVER THIS ITEM. THE CLOSEST NASA
FMEA IS 03-3-4581-1 FOR "OMS ENGINE PNEUMATIC PRESSURE SENSOR"
INSTEAD OF "OMS ENGINE REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE SENSOR".







NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELI_ [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2154-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]






METER, RT/LT OME PRESSURE PC





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [






] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)








































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4081-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SENSOR POSITION, BI-PROPELLANT VALVE 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FALSE INDICATION OF VALVE POSITION COULD LEAD TO LIMITING OMS
ENGINE USE, ESPECIALLY WHEN LITTLE TIME TO VERIFY. THE ENGINE
WILL BE USED ONLY IF THE OTHER ENGINE HAS FAILED AND THEN ONLY
FOR DEORBIT BURN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING LIFTOFF OR
ONORBIT PHASE WOULD LEAD TO FAILURE TO REACH DESIRED ALTITUDE
(LIMIT ALTITUDE TO RCS REDLINES TO ENSURE DEORBIT CAPABILITY) SO
COULD LOSE SOME ALTITUDE-SENSITIVE MISSIONS, IMPLYING CRIT 3/2R.
NASA REVIEW COMMENT'S ACTION ITEM PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS:"WILL
USE ENGINE IF LVDT > 70%. BETWEEN 8 AND 70% WILL NOT USE ENGINE
UNLESS NO OTHER OPTION AVAILABLE FOR DEORBIT."
SEE OMS TRAINING MANUAL 2102 PAGE 79.







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4081-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







SENSOR POSITION, BI-PROPELLANT VALVE 2
W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FALSE INDICATION OF VALVE POSITION COULD LEAD TO LIMITING OMS
ENGIN__ _ ESPECIALLY WHEN LITTLETI_ TO _RIFY. THE ENGINE
WILL BE USED ONLY IF THE OTHER ENGINE HAS FAILED AND THEN ONLY
FOR DEORBIT BURN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING LIFTOFF OR _
ONORBIT PHASE WOULD LEAD TO FAILURE TO REACH DESIRED ALTITUDE
(LIMIT ALTITUDE TO RCS REDLINES TO ENSURE DEORBIT CAPABILITY) SO
COULD LOSE SOME ALTITUDE-SENSITIVE MISSIONS, IMPLYING CRIT 3/2R.
NASA REVIEW COMMENT'S ACTION ITEM PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS:"WILL
USE ENGINE IF LVDT > 70%. BETWEEN 8 AND 70% WILL NOT USE ENGINE
UNLESS NO OTHER OPTION AVAILABLE FOR DEORBIT."






























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4805-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE CHAMBER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ _ /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ] ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NEW [ X ]
OMS
696
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE FUEL INLET PRESS





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4803-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE OX INLET PRESS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4802-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]






SENSOR TEMPERATURE ENGINE FUEL FEED LINE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




!OA RE_Co_NDs UPGRADING AND ADDING THIS FMEA TO THE CIL LIST
BECAUSE OF AN ABORT CRIT 1/1. THE ASSOCIATED ENGINE TEMPERATURES
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<25 F OR >130 F), UNLESS SENSOR
FAILURE WAS DETERMINED. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY (THE OTHER OMS
ENGI-NE_iS SENSOR ?AI_D) COULD LEAD TO IN_OP/[E_TLY FAILING BOTH
OMS ENGINES AND POSSIBLE EARLY MISSION TERMINATION AND LOSS OF
MISSION. HOWEVER, THIS IS AN ESPECIALLY SERIOUS CRITICALITY 1/1
DURING ABORTS BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT TIME TO DETERMINE FAILURE.























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SENSOR TEMPERATURE, ENGINE FUEL INJECTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
u
B
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4802-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SENSOR TEMPERATURE, ENGINE OX VALVE







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OX ENGINE INLET




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


















NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6407-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SENSOR POSITION,__A.CTIVE PITCH ACTUATOR







HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [



































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6407-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SENSOR POSITION, ACTIVE YAW ACTUATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















03-3-6407-1 NEW [ X ]
OMS i
704
SENSOR POSITION, STANDBY PITCH ACTUATOR







HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
0MS-705
03-3-6407-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
705




[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE TH_S ........
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELE_NTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRAC_ MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DE LETE )














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT kITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR S!N_ETHIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXI_TELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRAC_ MECHANICALPROBLEMDEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[P] [P] [P] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THiS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA: ......
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/!R SINCE THIS _ _i
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GRouP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."








































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)























LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
E
(If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM _SSOFC_W/VEHIC_, _D DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GR--OUP WOULD RESULT-IN BOTH E_MENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEE_I_ TH_ POD STRUCTURA L
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA: :: _
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )









































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] C P ]
CP] CP]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA
BASELINE [ ] ....
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA: _ _
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA RECQ_NDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO _2/IR_!_CE THI_I_ _ _
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY ?ROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA: ..........
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA RECOMMENDs RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE_$1 _=
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCURBEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE _SULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
0N SIMULTANEOUSL_ WH_ TH--E _DUND_T+ H_EATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F INI APPROX_TELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/_HIC_ DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL _C_ MECHANICAL PROB_M DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT _ 3 _- ALTERNATI$E ACTiNg+AND TI_ T0 +ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECO_NDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS ......
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




I0A RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR S_E THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAIL_ AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRU_RAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION _D_T!_ TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."





















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/nmc A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










ASSESSMENT DAT _ : _I/0 i/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-728
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS _SULTS IN A TEMPERA_EXCEEDING THE POD STRUC_RAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE RED_DANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F _IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACT/_RE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
=:
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTE_ATI_ ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT A?TER SECOND
FAILURE) NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCETHI$ -
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FRoM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEH_ICLE DUET O STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. N_A'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIE_D PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAII_D ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL _tT_ ___OBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATIO-NAND APPLICATION _O? INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER _ROUP WOULD RESULT_BOTH E_S OF_TWC>ORMORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERA__ EXCEEDING THE POp STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENT_IAL F_C_ MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
===
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / l c i c _ c 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





















NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA_RECOMMENDS _ISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERA_ EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRU_L D_GE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWuO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL _C_ _CHANICAL PROB_ DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] C P ]
[P] [P]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[P] CP] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/!R SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
HAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
HAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-713
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET _ _ I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-746






NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] [P] [P]
[P] [P] CP]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILU_IS bNE FAILU_ AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSQCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. _ A SEgOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED DIMITIOF_4215F IN APPRQXIMATELY _0 MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRAC_ _C_ICAL PRQB_DEPEND!NG ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINEC




LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT: _ _;_
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/1 R _INC E THIS ......
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM _LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON. "























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )















NASA DATA: _ ..........
BASEL_ [ _]









NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]












[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2016-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C















































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]




















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]











[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C














































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2016-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




_ i_ _ _ _ _ _





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
















[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2016-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]








NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2016-I
NASA DATA: : :_-_








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [















































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )













NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2016-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2012-I
NASA DATA: _..
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [F] [P]
CP] CP] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2012-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2012-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2012-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
C 3 /2R ] C P ] [ P ] C P ]
C / ] C ] [N] [ ]
NASA DATA;
BASELINE [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]














































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]
















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] E ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]








NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2012-I










HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2012-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2012-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
















[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]













NEW [ X ]
i





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
















[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2012-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2009-I
_BASELINE [ ] _








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[P] [P] [P] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















































[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2009-I
NASA DATA:
_SELINE [ ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ p ] [ P ]
[P] [p]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NKSA DATA_ __ _ _
BASELINE [ ]




OMS _i@. _ ........
782
HEATER, LT/RT ENGINE SERVICE PANEL GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)









































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT ENGINE SERVICE PANEL GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 12R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 12R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
w






NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS .....
MDAC ID: 784
ITEM: .....HEATER, LT/RT ENGIN E SERVICE PANEL GROUP 2





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT ENGINE SERVICE PANEL GROUP 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
















HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PANEL GROUP 1




HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PANEL GROUP 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PANEL GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HEATER, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOARECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT




























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































HEATER, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
w
h











NASA DATA: _: :_.....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS -_:-
794
HEATER, LT/RT OME COMPAR_NTGROUP 1






NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]







[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [p]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































NEW [ X ]
OMS
795
HEATER, LT/RT OME COMPARTMENT GROUP 1
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT OME COMPARTMENT GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] ] C ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT OME COMPARTMENT GROUP 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
w







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
_ _i_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _


































NASA FMEA # : 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HEATER, LT/RT OME OUTBOARD & INBOARD COVER GROUP





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HEATER, LT/RT OME OUTBOARD & INBOARD COVER GROUP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]


































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HEATER, LT/RT OME OUTBOARD & INBOARD COVER GROUP





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ p ] [ P ]
[p] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT OMS ENGINE COMPARTMENT GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





MS _ _¸ • _ _
804







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] E ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : _ ...._ _'





















NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT OMS ENGINE COMPARTMENT GROUP 2





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
/ ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-i
NAS A DATA: ........._....
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT OMS KEEL WEB GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NASA FME #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT OMS KEEL WEB GROUP 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
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NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA: _--_
_ BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































HEATER, LT/RT OMS KEEL WEB GROUP 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
m





NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ -]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 810
ITEM: HEATER, LT/RT OMS TEST PORT GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] .
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT OMS TEST PORT GROUP 1
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT OMS TEST PORT GROUP 2





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT OMS TEST PORT GROUP 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
















HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PANEL GROUP 1





NAsA [ 3 12R ]
IOA [ 3 13 ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PANEL GROUP 1





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.












ITEM: HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PANEL GROUP 2





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ]



































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT OX PRESS PANEL GROUP 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
w
w







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASADATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING DRAIN PANEL GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING DRAIN PANEL GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOARECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
i






NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING DRAIN PANEL GROUP 2





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING DRAIN PANEL GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.














NEW [ X ]
822
HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH DOWN GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE




































HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH DOWN GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH DOWN GROUP 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.






NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 1




HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )

























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
m







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 2





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
N_ASA ;DAT_:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RTRCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
w
















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
OMS-832
03-3-7001-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
832
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [N] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 1




HDW/nmC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [





































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
L














NEW [ X ]
OMS
836





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
C ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
w







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:_ ....... _
BASELINE [ ]







HEATER, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD_Y WEB GROUP 1
W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
__FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA D.AT_" .-- :
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





HEATER, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1




_DW/_c A 8 C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
CP] C p ]
CP] CP]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HEATER, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




I0A RECO_NDS RAISING THis CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXI_TELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."






































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ I ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2134-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /iR ]
[ P] [ F] [ P] [ X] *
[P] [P] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR dIN CE THIS .......
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS _SULTS IN A TEMPERATU_ E_CEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED L IMI_ OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/_HIC_ DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS TH_IS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON. "































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]

























[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IS SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
AssoCIATED HE-ATE-R-SET FAI_D ON- A s-ECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY _O MI_TES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON



















(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON. "
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.
==
I















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2134-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA P_COMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/1R SINC_E TH_I_S
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY ?ROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO ST_R_UCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FM_A HAZARDS FIELD PART!_ALLY _PpORTS_!S: _ ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION O? INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE
(CRIT 3 - ALTERNATIVE ACTION AND TIME TO ABORT AFTER SECOND
FAILURE). NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS MULTIPLE HEATERS FAILED ON."









































[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ / ] C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] C F ] C P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2089-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 855
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2089-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 856
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE C /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ p ] [ F ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2089-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 857
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W







[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]




















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2089-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 859
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








[ P ] C F ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2089-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 861
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]







NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2089-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 862
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ F ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] E ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2089-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 865
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W







[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ F ]
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]




















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA z
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
_ADD/DELET_































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2089-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 867
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE _[ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2089-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 869
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



































RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2089-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 871
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2089-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 873
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA"
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2089-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 875
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )














N_A _A #: 05-6L-2089-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 876
ITS: _SISTOR, 1.2K 2W







[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELI_ [ ]







[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA # : 05-6L-2089-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 877
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2088-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 878
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ C ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2088-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 879
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] *
] C ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2088-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 880
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2088-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 881
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[
[
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















ITEM: SENSOR TEMPERATURE, COVER THERMO. TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] .
] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS GENE_TiNG A FMEA FOR THIS ITEM, POSSIBLY GROUPED
WITH OTHER POD TEMP SENSORS. NASA HAS NO APPARENT FMEATo
EXPLICITLY COVER THESE ITEMS. THE CLOSEST FMEA IS 03-3-2804-1



































SENSOR TEMPERATURE, ENGINE SERVICE PANEL
W.A. HAUFLER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3/3 ] [ ] C ] [






IOA RECOMMENDS GENERATING A FMEA FOR THIS ITEM, POSSIBLY GROUPED
WITH OTHER POD TEMP SENSORS. NASA HAS NO APPARENT FMEA TO
EXPLICITLY COVER THESE ITEMS. THE CLOSEST FMEA IS 03-3-2804-1
FOR CROSSFEED INSTEAD OF POD TEMPERATURE SENSORS.





















HDW/FUNC A _ B C _ _
NASA [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOAP, ECO--MMENDS GENERATiNG-A--FMEA FOR TH-IS-_IT_, POSSIBLY_G-ROUPED
WITH OTHER _D T_M_SENS0_S. ....NASA_N0 A_NT _A_O _
EXPLICITLY COVER THESE ITEMS. THE CLOSEST FMEA IS 03-3-2804-1
































SENSOR TEMPERATURE, LEFT/RIGHT SKIN TEMP 38




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS GENERATING A FMEA FOR THIS ITEM, POSSIBLY GROUPED
WITH OTHER POD TEMP SENSORS. NASA HAS NO APPARENT FMEA TO
EXPLICITLY COVER THESE ITEMS. THE CLOSEST FMEA IS 03-3-2804-1
FOR CROSSFEED INSTEAD OF POD TEMPERATURE SENSORS.






















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS GENERATING A FMEA FOR THIS ITEM, POSSIBLY GROUPED
WITH OTHER POD TEMP SENSORS. NASA HAS NO APPARENT FMEA TO
EXPLICITLY COVER THESE ITEMS. THE CLOSEST FMEA IS 03-3-2804-1



































SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OX DRAIN PANEL TEMP 1 & TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ j
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS GENERATING A FMEA FOR THIS ITEM, POSSIBLY GROUPED
WITH OTHER POD TEMP SENSORS. NASA HAS NO APPARENT FMEA TO
EXPLICITLY COVER THESE ITEMS. THE CLOSEST FMEA IS 03-3-2804-1
FOR CROSSFEED INSTEAD OF POD TEMPERATURE SENSORS.
















SENSOR TEMPERATURE, RCS HOUSING VERNIER




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS GENERATING A FMEA FOR THIS ITEM, POSSIBLY GROUPED
WITH OTHER POD TEMP SENSORS. NASA HAS NO APPARENT FMEA TO
EXPLICITLY COVER THESE ITEMS. THE CLOSEST FMEA IS 03-3-2804-1





























ITEM: SENSOR TEMPERATURE, RCS HOUSING VERNIER
COMPARTMENT TEMP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA RECOMMENDS GENERATING A FMEA FOR THIS ITEM, POSSIBLY GROUPED
WITH OTHER POD TEMP SENSORS. NASA HAS NO APPARENT FMEA TO
EXPLICITLY COVER THESE ITEMS. THE CLOSEST FMEA IS 03-3-2804-1
FOR CROSSFEED INSTEAD OF POD TEMPERATURE SENSORS.
w

















SENSOR TEMPERATURE, RCS PRESS PANEL SPRT TEMP 1
W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ._ ITEM
HDW/_C A B C_
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS GENERATING A FMEA FOR THIS ITEM, POSSIBLY GROUPED
WITH OTHER POD TEMP SENSORS. NASA HAS NO APPARENT FMEA TO
EXPLICITLY COVER THESE ITEMS. THE CLOSEST FMEA IS 03-3-2804-1






























SENSOR TEMPERATURE, RCS PRESS PANEL SPRT TEMP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 13 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS GENERATING A FMEA FOR THIS ITEM, POSSIBLY GROUPED
WITH OTHER POD TEMP SENSORS. NASA HAS NO APPARENT FMEA TO
EXPLICITLY COVER THESE ITEMS. THE CLOSEST FMEA IS 03-3-2804-1
FOR CROSSFEED INSTEAD OF POD TEMPERATURE SENSORS.















SENSOR TEMPERATURE, UPPER Y-WEB INBOARD




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C
] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOARECOMMENDS GENERATING A FMEA FOR THIS ITEM, POSSIBLY GROUPED
WITH OTHER POD TEMP sENsoRs. NASA HAS NO APPARENT FMEA TO
EXPLICITLY COVER THESE ITEMS. THE CLOSEST FMEA IS 03-3-2804-1







































SENSOR TEMPERATURE, UPPER Y-WEB OUTBOARD
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS GENERATING A FMEA FOR THIS ITEM, POSSIBLY GROUPED
WITH OTHER POD TEMP SENSORS. NASA HAS NO APPARENT FMEA TO
EXPLICITLY COVER THESE ITEMS. THE CLOSEST FMEA IS 03-3-2804-1
FOR CROSSFEED INSTEAD OF POD TEMPERATURE SENSORS.






NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PANEL GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PANEL GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE."
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.












NEW [ X ]
OMS
896





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PANEL GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE. "
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.






NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM
GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS : ....
NO DIFFERENCES. _ :
:=


































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM
GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/1R SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE."
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.















THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM
GROUP 2









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM
GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE."
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.















OMS _TZ _ __
902










NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]










(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [


































NEW [ X ]
OMS
903
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE. "
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.






NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ _
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE."
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.





ASSESSMENT Iq): _ 0MS-906
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DAT_:_ ......
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COMPARTMENT GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NEW [ X ]
OMS
907
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COMPARTMENT GROUP 1
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
o
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE."
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.















NEW [ X ]
OMS
908




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COMPARTMENT GROUP 2
W.A. KAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASAIS BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE."
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.






ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-9 I0
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
I0A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] E ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE."
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.






NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
F
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/1R SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA WS BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE."
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A = B C __ ......
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :


































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE."
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.
















THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
_MARKS : = - _:--




























NEW [ X ]
OMS
917
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE."
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.















THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ _ _:_
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )









































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
919




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE."
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.







NASA _ #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






_ERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE. "
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1








NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [P] C
CP] [P] [P] C
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
C / ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
(If applicable) _ .......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]


























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
OMS
923
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT
PRESSURE."
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
OMS-924
03-3-7002-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
924




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) .......
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. --




























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS: "FAILED ON HEATER
MAY CAUSE POTENTIAL FRACTURE MECHANICAL PROBLEM DEPENDING ON
HEATER LOCATION AND APPLICATION OF INCREASED PROPELLANT PRESSURE."
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SPLITTING THIS FMEA, BECAUSE NASA COVERED POD
AND CROSSFEED ITEMS (THERMAL SWITCHES) IN THE SAME FMEA, BUT
THEIR CRITICALITIES AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-72A AND JSC 18549 NASA HEATER BOOK.








NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2031-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATER LT/RT POD GROUP1
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[211R] [P] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECO_NDS UPGRADING THE CRIT TO 2/IR, AND PASSING THE B
SCREEN. NASA FAILED ONLY ONE POLE OR CONTACT SET, CONSIDERING=
THE OTHER POLE AS REDUNDANT, WHEREAS IOA CONSIDE .RED THE WORST
CASE FAILURE MODE BY FAILING A PART COMMON TO BOTH POLES (E.G.
TOGGLE LEVER). THIS IS THE REASON FOR IOA'S HIGHER CRITICALITY


































SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATER LT/RT POD GROUP 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS UPGRADING THE CRIT TO 2/IR, AND PASSING THE B
SCREEN. NASA FAILED ONLY ONE POLE OR CONTACT SET, CONSIDERING
THE OTHER POLE AS REDUNDANT, WHEREAS IOA CONSIDERED THE WORST
CASE FAILURE MODE BY FAILING A PART COMMON TO BOTH POLES (E.G.
TOGGLE LEVER). THIS IS THE REASON FOR IOA'S HIGHER CRITICALITY
AND NASA'S FAILED B SCREEN, SINCE ONE POLE MAY BE UNDETECTABLE,
BUT NOT BOTH.













NEW [ X ]
OMS
928
SWITCH, TOGGLE, RCS/OMS HEATER LT/RT POD GROUP 1





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C










































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_W [ X ]
OMS
929




[ P ] [ P ]
[Pl [P]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2137-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








.UWl _'uNc A _ c
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2137-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA IMPLIES, WITH A B SCREEN OF "NA" (NOT APPLICABLE), THAT THIS
ITEM IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO SOME OTHER ITEM. IOA DISAGREES AND
RECOMMENDS PASSING THE B SCREEN, SINCE THIS DRIVER OPERATES
NORMALLY IN THE STRING, NOT PASSIVELY WAITING FOR ANOTHER ITEM TO
FAIL BEFORE IT OPERATES.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2137-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
C 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 1
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2137-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA IMPLIES, WITH A B SCREEN OF "NA" (NOT APPLICABLE), THAT THIS
ITEM IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO SOME OTHER ITEM. IOA DISAGREES AND
RECOMMENDS PASSING THE B SCREEN, SINCE THIS DRIVER OPERATES
NORMALLY IN THE STRING, NOT PASSIVELY WAITING FOR ANOTHER ITEM TO
FAIL BEFORE IT OPERATES.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2137-I
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2137-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NASA IMPLIES, WITH A B SCREEN OF "NA" (NOT APPLICABLE), THAT THIS
ITEM IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO SOME OTHER ITEM. IOA DISAGREES AND
RECOMMENDS PASSING THE B SCREEN, SINCE THIS DRIVER OPERATES
NORMALLY IN THE STRING, NOT PASSIVELY WAITING FOR ANOTHER ITEM TO
FAIL BEFORE IT OPERATES.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2137-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2137-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] IN] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA IMPLIES, WITH A B SCREEN OF "NA" (NOT APPLICABLE), THAT THIS
ITEM IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO SOME OTHER ITEM. IOA DISAGREES AND
RECOMMENDS PASSING THE B SCREEN, SINCE THIS DRIVER OPERATES
NORMALLY IN THE STRING, NOT PASSIVELY WAITING FOR ANOTHER ITEM TO
FAIL BEFORE IT OPERATES.













NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C __
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2137-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA IMPLIES, WITH A B SCREEN OF "NA" (NOT APPLICABLE), THAT THIS
ITEM IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO SOME OTHER ITEM. IOA DISAGREES AND
RECOMMENDS PASSING THE B SCREEN, SINCE THIS DRIVER OPERATES
NORMALLY IN THE STRING, NOT PASSIVELY WAITING FOR ANOTHER ITEM TO
FAIL BEFORE IT OPERATES.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2137-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ,, _
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2137-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C N ] [ ] [ ]
w
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3 /2R ] [ P ] C P ] C P ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA IMPLIES, WITH A B SCREEN OF "NA" (NOT APPLICABLE), THAT THIS
ITEM IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO SOME OTHER ITEM. IOA DISAGREES AND
RECOMMENDS PASSING THE B SCREEN, SINCE THIS DRIVER OPERATES
NORMALLY IN THE STRING, NOT PASSIVELY WAITING FOR ANOTHER ITEM TO
FAIL BEFORE IT OPERATES.











NEW [ X ]









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
COHPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]












































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
CP] CP]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2019-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




























NASA [ 3 /2R ]












NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















































[ 3 12R ] [ P ] [ P ]
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]






















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[P] [P] [P] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )








































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2020-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C 3 C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2020-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 952
ITEM: FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER FEED LINE (XFEED)
HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 953
ITEM: FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER FEED LINE (XFEED)
HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
r












NASA DATA: i_ it_
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
954
FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT FEED LINE (XFEED)
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT FEED LINE (XFEED)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 956
ITEM: FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE (XFEED)
HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)









NASA [ 3 /2R ]





COMPARE [ / ] [N] [N] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )










































ITEM: FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE (XFEED)
HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ I [ ] [ ] [ I
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
=
w






NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL HI POINT BLEED LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:










































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL HI POINT BLEED LINE HEATER ELEMENT (A/B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
w
















FUEL HI POINT BLEED LINE T-4 UMBILICAL HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
C!L
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE







































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








FUEL HI POINT BLEED LINE T-4 UMBILICAL HEATER
W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT












NASA FMEA # : 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOW POINT DRAIN LINE HEATER





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )



































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOW POINT DRAIN LINE HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
E
w






NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEFT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATER ELEMENTS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEFT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATER ELEMENTS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)




IOARECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.






NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







OXIDIZER HI POINT BLEED LINE HEATER ELEMENT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
967
OXIDIZER HI POINT BLEED LINE HEATER ELEMENT
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [






IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 968
ITEM: OXIDIZER HI POINT BLEED LINE T-4 UMBILICAL
HEATER (A/B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
iTEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








OXIDIZER HI POINT BLEED LINE T-4 UMBILICAL
W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
w
u
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-937
APPENDIX C






NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







R FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOW POINT DRAIN LINE HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







R FUEL AND OXIDIZER LOW POINT DRAIN LINE HEATER
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.
w















NEW [ X ]
OMS .....
972
RIGHT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATER





REpUNDANCy SCREENS .... ¢IL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [P] [ ]*
IF] IF] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ / ] [N] [N] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








RIGHT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATER
W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THESE FMEAS, SINCE HEATER ELEMENTS CANNOT
FAIL CLOSED OR SHORT SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONTINUOUSLY ON.








NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2136-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2136-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
























NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2094-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 979
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2094-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 980
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ......
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]_:
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )

































NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 981
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
C ]
C ]















ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W







NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2094-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 983
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2094-I
NASA DAT_$ _i_%_ ....._
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 984
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W









NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.






































ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-953






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2093-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 986
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]











] C ] *
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C





















































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO ISSUE. IOA IDENTIFIED A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







AFT FUSELAGE FUEL HI POINT BLEED LINE TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







AFT FUSELAGE FUEL HI POINT BLEED LINE TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
















NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
NAS A DATA: _ _ _ _
BASELINE [ ]







AFT FUSELAGE OXIDIZER HI POINT BLEED LINE TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







AFT FUSELAGE OXIDIZER HI POINT BLEED LINE TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
















NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BHD FUEL HI POINT BLEED LINE TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ]


















































NEW [ X ]
OMS
992




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] E
















NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BHD OXIDIZER HI POINT BLEED LINE TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BHD OXIDIZER HI POINT BLEED LINE TEMP SENSOR







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
















NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ -]







CENTER - AFT FUSELAGE OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REdS : _! _
IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAI_D OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY.







































CENTER - AFT FUSELAGE OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES OMS
II.5A NOTES 2,3,4.







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
NASA DATA: ........
BASELINE [ ]






LEFT AFT FUEL XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LEFT AFT FUEL XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
NASA DATA: _,
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)







































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEFT AFT FUSELAGE LOW POINT OXIDIZER DRAIN LINE









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]






(If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NEW [ X ]
OMS ....
997
LEFT - AFT FUSELAGE OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ASSUMED NO LA_CH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY.
































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEFT - AFT FUSELAGE OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THE_L SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LALrNCH AND OR POS_BLE--I_OSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE OMS
II.LA NOTES 2,3,4.













NEW [ X ]
OMS
998
LEFT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CR--ITICAL C_ROS_EED LINE, LEADING TO _
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS QF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY.






























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LEFT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >9OF) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE OMS
II.5A NOTES 2,3,4.













ITEM: RIGHT AFT FUEL XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C

































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RIGHT AFT FUEL XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RIGHT AFT FUSELAGE LOW POINT OXIDIZER DRAIN LINE
TEMP SENSOR









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RIGHT AFT FUSELAGE LOW POINT OXIDIZER DRAIN LINE
TEMP SENSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

















NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
NASA DATA::
BASELINE [ ]







RIGHT - AFT FUSELAGE OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : o _:_
IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >9OF) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY.






























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







RIGHT - AFT FUSELAGE OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
-(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED(THISENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABO_S).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITI_ CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY.
SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE OMS
II.5A NOTES 2,3,4.

















NEW [ X ]
OMS
1002
RIGHT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >9OF) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR P_S!_L__ LQSSOFMISSIONDUE TO oLOSSOF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2SINCE
NO REDUND_CY¥ _ii _ _- _ _°

























NASA FMEA # : 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RIGHT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY ++- REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY.










NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
_ELINE [ ]






FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (LT DECK)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA GROUPED PODAND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.













NEW [ X ]
OMS .....
1005
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (RT DECK)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (RT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]




[ 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
m








NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASAD_T_:
BAS ELI_ [ ]






FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER FEED LINE OVER TEMP





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
t / 1 E J _ j r [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER FEED LINE OVER TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
w





NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL & OX LOWER CENTER XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL & OX LOWER CENTER XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
w
m








NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELIN_E [ ]






FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT FEED LINE OVER TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)

















































NEW [ X ]
OMS
1012
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT FEED LINE OVER TEMP
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
i
I





ASSESSMEN T DATE: !/91/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-1013
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA: _ -_: ,






FUEL & OX LOWER LEFT XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP






HDW/FUNC A B C ...............
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )





































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
1014




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
















ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88 --
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-1015 ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 1015
ITEM: FUEL & QXIgIZ_ER_WER RIGHT FEED LINE OVER TEMP





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































NEW [ x ]
OMS
1016
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE OVER TEMP
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.







NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL & OX LOWER RIGHT XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL & OX LOWER RIGHT XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
BASE_i_E [ ]






FUEL FLEX LINE CONTROL TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL FLEX LINE CONTROL TEMP





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











ASSESSMENT DATE: !/01/88 NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-1021 BASELINE-[ ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 1021
ITEM: FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE CONTROL TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BAgE L_ [ ]






FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP ' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.














NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
OMS
1025
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P3 CP3





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.






NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB. CONTROL TEMP





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB. CONTROL TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
h
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






















L FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP









NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ) [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.














NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
N_A DATa:T_c_ _ _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
1031
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE CONTROL TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OXIDIZER FLEX LINE CONTROL TEMP





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NEW [ X ]
OMS
1035





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] CP] [P]
C ] C ] C ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE CONTROL TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [















NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NEW [ X ]
OMS
1038




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP ' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.














NEW [ X ]
OMS
1041





HDW/_NC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CP] [P] [P]
[ ] C ] C ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB. CONTROL TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA:






R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP ' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-1
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]






R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE CONTROL TEMP

























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT DRAIN LINE CONTROL TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NEW [ X ]
OMS
1047
SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS XFEED LINES A AUTO ($7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS CRITICALITY OF 3/2R SINCE THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY (OTHER SWITCH FAILS) IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE



















NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS XFEED LINES A AUTO ($7)





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THIS NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2036-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH TOGGLE, OMS XFEED LINES B AUTO (S8)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
CP] [P] CP]
CN] CN] [N]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3 /2R ] C P ] [ P ] C P ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS cRITICALITY OF 3/2RSIN_E THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY (OTHER SWITCH FAILS) IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS UPGRADING THIS FMEA TO 2/2, 1/1 ABORT, THUS ADDING
THIS TO THE CIL LIST. IOA'S CRIT IS BASED ON THE HIGHEST
CRITICALITY OF THE SIGNALS ROUTED THROUGH THE SIGNAL
CONDITIONERS. THESE WORST CASE SIGNALS ARE FROM OMS ENGINE
TEMPERATURE AND
PRESSURE SENSORS (E.G. ENGINE REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE SENSOR;
0MS-689 OR SECTION 4.2.3.B.6). LOSS OF A VITAL ENGINE
MEASUREMENT WILL PREVENT THE CREW FROM USING THAT OMS ENGINE FOR
NONCRITICAL BURNS, RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
























]OA RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ITEMS - OMS HARDWARE
U
lml
I S SZ I----.ZSr_=UIS|alDII|||Z_I;:= =r|lz._|zlmz|| ||=:s|'_,_:z|-----=:c:: |_:|| :_ll_::wl I
NASA EMEA ASSESSMENT ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
NUMBER NUMBER









































































REGULATOR ASSY, HELIUM PRESSURE
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE





VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES, FUEL
VALVE, GUAD CHECK VALVES, OXIDIZER
VALVE,, _ CHECK VALVES







LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
VALVE, QUiD CHECK VALVES
VALVE-PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
VALVE-GROUND, MANUAL ISOI.ATION
CGUPLING-TEST PORT, HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM
COUPLING-TEST PORT, VAPOR ISOLATION CHECKOUT
COUPLING-TEST PORT, GUAD CHECK VALVE
CGU_ING-TEST PORT, PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
_PLING-TEST PORT, PROPELLANT PRESSURE CHECK
COUPLING-TANK VENT
COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM TRAP FILL/VENT PORT
COUPLING-TANK ACO. SYSTEM FILL/VENT PORT
COUPLZNG-PROPELLAHT, TANK TEST PORT





FALLS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
INTERNAL LEAKAGE




GUT OF TOLERANCE, REGULATES AT LOW PRESSURE
RESTRICTED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE VIA BELLOWS & SENSING PORT
FALLS TO CLOSE, FALLS TO REMAIN CLOSED
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, REVERSE FLOW
FAILS TO OPEN, FALLS TO REMAIN OPEN
RESTRICTED FLC_
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, BACK FLC_




OUT OF TOLERANCE, RELIEF VALVE FAILS CLOSED
OUT OF TOLERANCE, BURST DISK RUPTURES
BURST DISK LEAK, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
OUT OF TOLERANCE, RELIEF VALVE FALLS CLOSED
FALLS TO CLOSE, VALVE FAILS TO RESEAT
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE































• ' APPENDIX D
IOA RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ITEMS - OMS HARDWARE
NASA FMEA ASSESSMENT iD ITEM
NUMBER NUMBER













































































COUPLING-PROP TANK, HORIZONTAL DRAIN PORT
COUPLING " PROPELLANT LOW-POINT DRAIN
COUPLING-UMS/RCS PROPELLANT FILL PORT
COUPLING - PROPELLANT GROUND-PURGE
COUPL ING-CROSSFEED DRAIN
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HNH AND NTO
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
VALVE - CROSSFEED
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE






VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
VALVE " BIPROPELLANT VALVE
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
PNELI4AT ] C ACTUATOR
PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY
PINION GEAR & DRIVE ASSEMBLY
VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE






STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAK
RUPTURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HELIUM PASSAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HELIUM PASSAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF RETENTION
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HELIUM PASSAGE










STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAk:
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAK
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
FALLS TO CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAHNING
FAILS TO OPERATE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAHHING
FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO OPEN, FALLS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN OR OPERATE, BIMDING/JAHNING
INTERNAL LEAKAGE, PISTON SEAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPERATE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRACTURE
DELAYED OPERATION
FALLS MIDTRAVEL,, PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED
FAILS MIDTRAVEL, PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED
DELAYED OPERATION
DELAYED OPERATION













_ _A ASSES_EMT ID ITEM
NUMBER NUMBER
_-3-4_1-5 0NS-341 P_T IC ACTUAT_
0_-_3 P_ATIC AC_T_
(]I_-259 VALVE - BIPROPELLANT VALVE
_-249 ENGINE INLET FILTER A_ ORIFICE

















































GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR '
GH2 PRESSURE REGULATOR
COUPLING, GN2 REGULATOR TEST _RT
C_LING - HIGH-POINT BLEED TEST PORT
COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN/PURGE TEST _RT
CGUPLING - BIPROP VAL_ DRAIN _RT



























:'_ CHECK VALVE-GNZ PURGE
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS








GIHBAL RING MOUNTING PAD









ST_L FAILURE, CONTANINATION PASSAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, _P_E, EXTERNAL LEAK I
ST_URAL FAILURE, _RN THROUGH
-STRU_RAL FAILURE. _IN_RNAL LEAKAGE i
RESTRICTED FLO_, CLOGGED !
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (BURN THROUGH, FRACTURE) I
ST_C_L FAIL_E. BURN THROUGH __
::Sl;I_J-L'_JRAL FAILURE, FRACTURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (BURN THROUGH, FRACTURE) I
STI_CTURAL FAIL_E.--_CKLING(DURING ASCENT) -_
Eli
IN_RNAL_XTERNAL LEAKAGE I
OUT OF TOLERANCE, OPENS AT LOW PRESSURE
REG FAIL OPEN _D RELIEF VALVE FAIL CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN t
RESTRICTED FLOW








INTERNAL LEAKAGESTRUCTURAL FAILURE. RUPTURE. EXTERNAL LEAK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE. RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAK I
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
























APPEND I X D
IOA RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ITEMS - _ HARDWARE






















































DRIVE GEARS, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY






LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-HELIUM PRESSURE
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMH AND NTO
VALVE-GROUND, MANUAL ISOLATION






GIMBAL RING BEARING, MOUNTING PAD ATTACHMENT
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
BEARING " SECONDARY DRIVE GEAR
VALVE-PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION




CROSSFEED PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
CROSSFEED PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
VALVE-CROSSFEED









VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
OME ALIGNMENT BELLO_
PROPELLANT LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS-MMH AND HTO
PNEUMATIC PACK HOUSING ASSEMBLY
GN2 PRESSURE LINES AND MECHANICAL FITTINGS
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
ORIFICE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE INLET
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JANMING
FAILS TO OPERATE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JN4HING
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAJ_IING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE




FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
RESTRICTED FLOM, BLOCKAGE
OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JANMING
RESTRICTED FLOW
OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAHMING
RESTRICTED FLOW




OUT OF TOLERANCE, RELIEF VALVE FAILS CLOSED
RESTRICTED FLOM, BLOCKAGE





OUT OF TOLERANCE, RELIEF VALVE FAILS CLOSED
RESTRICTED FLON, BLOCKAGE
OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAHMIHG
RESTRICTED FLOW
OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL B]ND[NG/JAHMIHG
RESTRICTED FLOW
OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAHMIHG
RESTRICTED FLOW
OUT OF TOLERANCE, PHYSICAL BINDIHG/JAMMING
RESTRICTED FLOW
FALLS TO OPEN, AT SPECIFIED PSID
FAILS TO CLO_E, VALVE FAILS TO RESEAT









I_ RECOI4ENDED CRITICAL ITEMS - OMS HARDWARE 1
NUMBER NUMBER
.....eoel. ...... i.oee.ee.. ...... ........................'''''''----'''' ...... ... ........
0145-333 ORIFICE-EMGINE CONTROL VALVE VENT
0MS-334 CHECK VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE VENT
CI4S-335 CHECK VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE VENT
C1_-336 CHECK VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL VALVE VENT
OMS-3_. PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
=





FAILS TO OPEN I
FAILS TO CLOSE I
INTERNAL LEAK.AGE [.._INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (PROPELLANT)











































































SENSOR TEHPERATURE, FUEL TANK LOWER
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, OX LOWER TANK
CENTER - AFT FUSLG (_IDIZER XFEED LINE TENP SENSOR
LEFT - AFT FUSLG D0(IDIZER XFEED LINE TENP SENSOR
LEFT AFT OKIDIZER XFEED LINE TENP SENSOR
RIGHT - AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TENP SENSOR
RIGHT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LIME TEHP SENSOR
SENSOR TENPERATIJRE ENGINE FUEL FEED LINE






































ENG SERV PNL GROUP 1
ENG SERV PNL GROUP 2
ENG SERV PNL GROUP 2
GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 1
GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 1
GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 2
GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP 2
LOUER IXBD Y WEB GROUP 1
LOWER I NBD Y UEB GROUP 1
LOWER I NBD Y _JEB GROUP 2
LOWER INBD Y WEB GROUP 2
ONE COI4PT GROUP 1
ONE CONPT GROUP 1
ONE COMPT GROUP 2
KEEL UEB GROUP 1
ORS KEEL _EB GROUP 1
Ol,IS KEEL WEB GROUP 2
014S KEEL _,_B GROUP 2
OX PRESS PNL GROUP 1
OK PRESS PNL GROUP 2
RCS HOUSING DRAIN PNL GROUP 1
RCS HOUSING DRAIN PNL GROUP 1
RCS HOUSING DRAIN PNL GROUP 2
RCS HOUSING DRAIN PNL GROUP 2
RCS HOUSING PITCH DN GROUP 1
RCS HOUSING PITCH DN GROUP 1
RCS HOUSING PITCH DH GROUP 2
RCS HOUSING PITCH DN GROUP 2
RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 1
RCS HOUSING PITCH LIP GROUP 1
RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 2
RCS HOUSING PITCH UP GROUP 2
RCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 1
RCR HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 1
RCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 2
RCS HOUSING VERNIER GROUP 2
RCS HOUSING YAM GROUP 1
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORT, _I_ONG VALUE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORT, WRONG VALUE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SNORT, kI_ONG VALUE)
ERRONEOUS OUTP£1T (OPEN, SHORT, WRONG VALUE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SNORT, _RONG VALUE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORT, _RONG VALUE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORT. WRONG VALUE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORT, WRONG VALUE)
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO HOUNT1NG SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN, FALLS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING SO OPENS
FALLS OPEN, FALLS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FALLS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT. SHORTS TO HOUNTING SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FALLS SHORT. SHORTS TO MOUNTING SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHCRT, SHORTS TO 14OUNTING SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN, FALLS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO NCUNTING SO OPENS
FAILS SHORT, SHO_TS TO MOUNTING, SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT. SHORTS TO 14CUNTING, SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN, FALLS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING, SO OPENS
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO HOUNTING, SO OPENS
FALLS SHORT, SHORTS TO t4CUNTING, SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN. FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO NCUNTIHG, SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO NCIJNTIHG, SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN. FALLS TO PROV]DE HEAT
FALLS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING, SO OPENS
FAILS (]PER, FALLS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING, SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN, FALLS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO NCUHTING, SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN, FALLS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MCUNTIHG, SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN, FALLS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SNORT, SHORTS TO NCUNTIHG, SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN, FALLS TO PROVIDE HEAT
FAILS SNORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING, SO OPENS
FAILS OPEN, FALLS TO PROVIDE HEAT
D-7
iAPPENDIX D m,,
]OA RECOHNENDED CRITICAL ITEMS - OIS EPO&C
. _ _ = - _- _- == _ J -- ==_ ........ _-.=_ =_.-. __---_-=_==_-=_-=__---_-=_ __ = ;_-.=__..n_-._--__-_-_-_-_.._.....
NASA FI_ ASSESSMENT ID ITEM FAILURE NODE _1
NUMBER NUI4BER J
03-3-7001-1 (_lS-835 HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 1 FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING, SO OPENS [,j
0NS-836 HEATER,, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 2 FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO PROVIDE HEAT J
0PS-837 HEATER, LT/RT RCS HOUSING YAW GROUP 2 FAILS SHORT, SHORTS TO MOUNTING, SO OPENS J __
03-3-7002-! OleS-IO03 FUEL & OXIDIZER FAILs OPEN EJ
ONS-IO0§ FUEL & OXIDIZER FAILS OPEN
014S-1007 I FUEL & CO(IDIZEN FALLS OPEN I
OIlS-lOll FUEL & OXIDIZER FALLS (3PEN I -
Om-lO15 FUEL & OXIDIZER FALLS OPEN _i
03-3-7002-2 OXS-895 THERI4AL SWITCH FALLS SHORT J
01_-897 THERMAL SWITCH FAILS SHORT J
014S-899 THERI4AL SWITCH FAILS SHORT
0NS-901 THERMAL SWITCH FALLS SHORT P
OHS-_I3 THERHAL SWITCH FALLS SHORT I
ONS-ROS THERMAL SWITCH FALLS SHORT I
OHS" 907' _ THE-RNAL SWITCH FA I LS SHORT
QHS'909 THERttAL SWITCH FALLS SHORT J
OHS-911 THERI4AL SWITCH FAILS SHORT I--
0NS'913 THERK_L SWITCH FAILS SHORT I J
0HS-915 THEP_AL SWITCH FALLS SHORT J--"
0VS-917 THERMAL SWITCH FAILS SHORT
0NS'919 THERMAL SUITCH FALLS SHORT l_
0NS'92i : THERMAL SUITCH, FAILS SHORT
014S-9Z3 THEI_4AL SWITCH, FALLS SHORT [
ONS-92S THERHAL SWITCH, FAILS SHORT ]
OHS-IO04 FUEL & OXIDIZER FAILS SHORT _j
ONS-IO06 FUEL & OXIDIZER FALLS SHORT I
OflS-I(X)8 FUEL & OXIDIZER FALLS SHORT I
OHS-101O FUEL & OX LOWER FALLS SHORT l_
ONS-1012 FUEL & OXIDIZER FAILS SHORT p,
0148-1016 FUEL & OXIDIZER FAILS SHORT I
_-i024 FAILS SHORT _
OleS- 1026 FAILS SHORT
01_- 1030 FAILS SHORT I
014S- 1038 FALLS SHORT
ONS- 1040 FAILS SHORT ___
DNS- 1044 FA[LS SHORT 1--
03-3-7011-1 ONS-9SZ FALLS OPEN J
0NS-953 FA]I.$ SHCRT |-
0MS-954 FAILS OPEN
014S-_5 FAILS SHORT J
0NS-956 FAILS OPEN [ :
0NS-957 FAILS SHORT _,i
0HS-964 FAILS OPEN C
0HS-96_ FAILS SHORT I
0NS-972 ....... FAILS OPEN _ _
0NS-973 RIGHT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATERS (A/B) FAILS SHORT
FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (LT DECK)
FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (RT DECK)
LOWER CENTER FEED LINE OVER TENP
LOWEN LEFT FEED LINE OVER TENP
LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE OVER TEHP
LT/RT GEE SERVICE PNL GROUP 1
LT/RT GEE SERVICE PNL GROUP 2
LT/RT KEEL _B HEATER SYSTEM GROUP 1
LTIRT KEEL me HEATER SYSTEM GROUP 2
LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROL_ 2
LT/RT ONE CC14_1
LT/RT ONE COHPT GROUP 2
LT/RT ONE COVER GROUP 1
LT/RT OHE COVER GROUP
LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
LT/RT uPPeR INBOARD Y-me GROUP 1
LT/RT UPPER INBOARD_Y-UEB GRouP 2
LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 1
LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP 2
FLEX LINE OVER TENP (LT DECK)
FLEX LINE OVER TEI4P (RT DECK)
LONER CENTER FEED LINE OVER TENP
CENTER XFEED LINE CONTROL TENP
LOWER LEFT FEED LINE OVER TENP
LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE OVER TEHP
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UI4B OVER TEMP
L FUEL & CO(IDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TENP
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 LIMB OVER TEHP
R FUEL & CO(ZDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TENP
FUEL & OX LOWER CENTER FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER A/8
FUEL & OX LONER CENTER FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER A/B
FUEL & CO( LONER LEFT FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER A/B
FUEL & CO( LOUER LEFT FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER A/B
FUEL & CO( LOUER RIGHT FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER A/B
FUEL & CO( LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE (XFEED) HEATER A/B
LEFT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATERS (A/B)
LEFT FUEL AND OXIDIZER FLEX LINE HEATERS (A/B)








;OA RECOI44ENDED CRITICAL ITEHS - 014S EPO&C
NASA FNEA ASSESSI4ENT ID ITEM
NUNBER NLg4BEN











05 - 6L - 2030- I
05-6L-2030-Z
05-6L-2031 -Z


















































CENTER " AFT FUSLG O0(IDIZER XFEED LINE TEI4P SENSOR
LEFT - AFT FUSLG ONIDIZER XFEED LiNE TE14P SENSOR
LEFT AFT O0(IDIZER XFEED LINE TENP SENSOR
RIGHT - AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEHP SENSOR










SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT ONS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VI.V A
SNITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT ONS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV B
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT ONS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV A
SWITCH TOGGLE, LT/RT ONS HE PRESS VAPOR ISOL VLV B
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
SWITCH, CNS LT/RT ENG ARN/PRESS (C3A1, S1/SZ)
SWITCH, OI4S LT/RT ENG ANN/PRESS (C3AI, $1/$2)
SWITCH, ONS LT/RT ENG ARN/PRESS (C3A1. $1/S2)
SWITCH, ONS LT/RT ENG CONTROL VLV
SWITCH, ONS LT/RT ENG CONTROL VLV
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/ONS HEATER LT/RT POD GROUP1




















......... o ........................ o. ....... .=
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORT, _,IRONGVALUE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORT, UROHG VALUE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORT, WRONG VALUE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORT, WRONG VALUE)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORT, WRONG VALUE)









FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN GPC POSITION)
FALLS TO SI_ITCH (STUCK IN GPC POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN CLOSE POSITION)
FAILS TO SNITCH (STUCK IN CLOSE POSITION)
FALLS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION)
FALLS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN OFF POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN ARH/PRESS POS.)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN ARN POSITION)
FALLS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN OFF POSITION)
FAILS TO S_ITCH (STUCK IN ON POSITION)
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN ON POSITION)



















05-6L-2083A-1 ONS-538 RESISTOR, 1.2K 1/6W FALLS OPEN
D-9
i_PE_IX D





































































































FA_S _ (R_AY FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
FALLS OPEN (RELAY FAILS TO ENERGIZE) 17FAILS OPEN (RELAY FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
FALLS OPEN (RELAY FAILS TO ENERGIZE) I
FALLS OPEN (FAILS TO E_RGIZE) I :
FAILS OPEN I_FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE)
FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE) I
FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE) l _
FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE) l_
FAILS OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE) 1
FALLS OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE) I
FAILS HIGH (ENERGIZED POSITION) I_
IFAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH (FAILS ENERGI_D) I
FAILS HIGH l--





FAILS HIGH J _
FAILS OPEN I
FAILS _EN j i
FALLS OPEN I
FALLS OPEN I

















IOA RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ITEMS - ONS EPD&C
NASA FNEA ASSESSMENT ID ITEM
NUMBER HUMBER
I °" ............. "" ...... " .......... "'" ........ "" .......





05 - 6L - 22 53 - I





05-6L- 225-3C - 1
05-6L- 22530-1
05 - 6L - 2255 - I
05 - 6L - 2256 - 1
05-6L- 225_- 1
05 -6L - 22568- 2





































































































FAILS OPEN (LOSS OF OUTPUT)






























011S-456 DIODE FALLS OPEN
D-If
APPENDIX D
]OA REL'OHI4ENDED CRITICAL ITEMS - ONS EPD&C
II









































05 -6L - 2..25"TB- 2
05-6L- 2257C- 1
05-61.- 22571)- 1
05 - 6L - 2258 - 1
05 - 6L- 7..259-1
05-6L-2260-1
05 - 6L - 2260A- 1









































































































This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper I.O-WP-VA86001-
21, Analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem (OMS), (12
January 1987). Prior results were obtained independently and
documented before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity.
Supplemental analysis was performed to address failure modes not
previously considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the
hardware item being analyzed, parent assembly and function
performed. For each failure mode possible causes are identified,
and hardware and functional criticality for each mission phase
are determined as described in NSTS 2_206, _nstructions for
Preparation o$ FM_A and CIL, I00ctobe_ 1986. Failure mode
effects are described at the bottom of each sheet and worst case
criticality is identified at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR z Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:







STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION PASSAGE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:







REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 1181821
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL DEFECT,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PASSAGE OF CONTAMINATION INTO REGULATOR MAY RESULT IN FAILURE OF
REGULATOR. WITH FAILURE TO OPEN OF REGULATOR, ONE FAILURE (SAME
FAILURE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE ACCUMULATORS AND LOSS OF START
CAPABILITY FOR BOTH ENGINES. FAILURE UNDETECTABLE UNTIL ENGINE


















REFERENCES". 1) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009
3) VS70-9431099, 43AD, BD, 4) JSC 11174, 11.3
g






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:







GIMBAL RING BEARING, GIMBAL RING/MOUNTING PAD
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, DISATTACHMENT















GIMBAL RING BEARING, GIMBAL RING/MOUNTING PAD ATTACHMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO : I/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, IMPROPER ASSEMBLY,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO EXCESSIVE
MOVEMENT OF ENGINE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF CONNECTING
PROP LINES ALLOWING LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP, FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) MC621-0059
4) JSC 18958
3) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 E-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:






PINION GEAR AND DRIVE ASSEMBLY _
DELAYED OPERATION











SUBSYS LEAD: C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
2 _21_!2 5 _2L--2 X _2_ _ _ 21
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, IMPROPER ASSEMBLY,
I_TERIAL/_FA_rURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION, BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOW INITIAL FUEL AND OXID FLOW RATES TO
ENGINE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO AND LOSS OF ENGINE (MANUAL
SHUTDOWN REQUIRED). WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (ASSEMBLY IN
REDUNDANT POD) AWAY FRoM POSSIB_ LOSS_0FLIFE/VEHICLE_DUE TO
LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ONE ENGINE AND
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP.
REFERENCES: 1) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099, 43AD,



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:






VALVE - PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
RESTRICTED FLOW













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0421-0015, -0016
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FILTER BLOCKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (REGS)
RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS AND LINES
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: I) 73A000014, #213, 214 2) VS70-431099 3) MC284-
0421 4) VS70-943099, 43AA, BA 5) JSC 11174, 11.3 6) JSC 12770
-- REPORT DATE 2/26/88 E-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
RESTRICTED FLOW .....















BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/i _
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FILTER BLOCKAGE
EFFECTS/R/iTIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE OF POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. INABILITY TO
RELIEVE OVERPRESSURIZATION OF BIPROP VALVE CAVITY MAY RESULT IN
STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE BIPROP VALVE HOUSING, LOSS AND LEAKAGE

































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:






PINION GEAR & DRIVE ASSEMBLY
FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED















PINION GEAR & DRIVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, INADEQUATE LUBRICATION,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF AFFECTED ENGINE. WITH FIRST
FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE
DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF ONE ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL
OMS DUMP.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099, 43AD,
BD 4) 1181710 5) JSC 11174, 11.3 6) JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 E-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:






BEARING - SECONDARY DRIVE GEAR
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING

















BEARING - SECONDARY DRIVE GEAR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, INADEQUATE LUBRICATION,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS_TIONALE: ....... E
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF SECONDARY CHANNEL DUE TO
INABILITY TO DRIVE NUT TUBE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH OMS ENGINES. Rcs USAGE
REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING OMS BURNS MAY BE
EXCESSIVE.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009
4) JSC 12770 5) JSC 18958








































BEARING - SECONDARY DRIVE GEAR
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
















BEARING - SECONDARY DRIVE GEAR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULT IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TVC FOR ONE ENGINE.
FAILURE MAY CAUSE BINDING/JAMMING OF GIMBAL DRIVE. WITH FIRST
FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH OMS ENGINES.
RCS USAGE REQUIRED FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING OMS BURNS MAY BE
EXCESSIVE. CRIT i/i FOR TAL POST-MECO OMS DUMP.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009
18958 5) JSC 11174, 9.13
2) MC621-0059 3) JSC 12770 4) JSC
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 E-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:






DRIVE GEARS, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
















DRIVE GEARS, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE--P_T STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, GEAR
STRIPPING, TOOTH FRACTURES, MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOss OF OR DEGRADED TVC FOR ONE
OMS ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SAME FAILURE IN
OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
BOTH OMS ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ONE ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO
COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP POST-MECO.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009
18958 5) JSC 11174, 9.13

























REPORT DATE 2/26/88 E-10
I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:







ENGINE/ACTUATOR AND ACTUATOR/VEHICLE ATTACH
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, DISATTACHEMENT
















ENGINE/ACTU.RATOR AND ACTUATOR/VEHICLE ATTACH HARDWARE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, IMPROPER ASSEMBLY,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
UNRESTRAINED MOVEMENT OF ACTUATOR RESULTING IN POSSIBLE RUPTURE
OF ENGINE PROP LINES, AND UNRESTRINED MOVEMENT OF AN OMS ENGINE
IN ONE AHS.
REFERENCES: I) MC621-0009 2) MC621-0059 3) JSC 12770 4) JSC
18958
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 E-If
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:






BEARING - ACTUATOR/VEHICLE ATTACHMENT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING



















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, IMPROPER ASSEMBLY,
INADEQUATE LUBRICATION, MANUFACTURING/MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF OR DEGRADED TVC FOR ONE OMS
ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (S_ FAILURE IN OTHER
POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH
OMS ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ONE ENGINE AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO
COMPLETE TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP POST-MECO.
REFERENCES: i) MC621-0009 2) MC621-0059
18958 5) JSC 11174, 9.13




































GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR AND PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
SIMULTANEOUS REG FAIL OPEN AND RELIEF VALVE FAIL















GN2 PRESSURE REGULATOR AND PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, pIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PISTON JAMS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF PISTON CAUSE SIMULTANEOUS REG FAIL OPEN AND RELIEF
VALVE FAIL CLOSED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN OVERPRESSURIZATION
AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM LINES AND COMPONENTS, LEADING
TO LOSS OF THE OMS ENGINE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (SAME
FAILURE IN OTHER POD) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE
TO LOSS OF BOTH OMS ENGINES. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ONE ENGINE AND
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE A TIME-CRITICAL OMS DUMP.
REFERENCES: 1) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009
BD 4) JSC 11174, 11.3 5) JSC 19950
3) VS70-943099, 43AD,
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 E-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH BELLOWS AND SENSING PORT














HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620002
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, BELLOWS LEAK, SEAL LEAK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (PARALLEL
REGULATOR LEG) RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. SLOW HELIUM
LEAK THROUGH SENSING PORT RESULTING FROM BELLOWS FAIL U_E COULD
RESULT IN MISSION MODIFICATION IN ORDER TO CONSERVE HELIUM
PRESSURANT OR ACHIEVE FULL BLOW-DOWN CAPABILITY IN AFFECTED POD.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 18958 2) MC621-0009 3) VS70-943099, 43AD,





















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/01/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:






VALVE - PROPELLANT TANK ISOLATION
RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED












PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TANK ISOL VALVES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREVIOUS FAILURE REQUIRED FOR VALVES TO BE CLOSED. FAILURE OF
RELIEF DEVICE IN ONE ISOL VALVE IS UNDETECTABLE AND HAS NO
EFFECT. PARALLEL DEVICE WILL RELIEVE PRESSURE. FAILURE OF
DEVICES IN BOTH VALVES IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM LINES.
VALVES OPEN DURING ABORTS. STANDBY REDUNDANCY (B SCREEN NA).
REFERENCES:
11174, 11.3
l) 73A000014 2) VS70-943099, 43AB, BB 3) JSC
4) MC284-0430
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 E-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/01/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: OMS FLIGHT:







RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED _













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM _
CROSSFEED VALVES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/_R
_DiNG/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (ALL OTHER
CROSSFEED VALVES) IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF CROSSFEED LINES.
STANDBY _DUNDANCY (B SCREEN NA).
REFERENCES:
11174, 11.3





































FAILS OPEN, ONE CIRCUIT PATH

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OMS PODS, AV BAY 4,5,6, MIDBODY
40V75A23,40V75A74,40V75A21,40V75A23,40V75A74,
51V75A25,51V75A77,54V75AI9,55V75A20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE WOULD BE TO LOSE ABILITY TO UTILIZE THE OMS ENGINE
REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE SENSOR, PT006. THIS COULD LEAD TO
FALSELY FAILING THE OMS ENGINE (SEE FLIGHT RULE 6-4, LINE
FAILURE). FOR LO& OO, LOSS OF AN OMS ENGINE WOULD RESULT IN
LIMITING ATTITUDE TO RCS DEORBIT CAPABILITIES, THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IN THE DO PHASE COULD LEAD TO
FAILURE OF TWO OMS ENGINES AND THEREFORE LOSS OF DEORBIT
CAPABILITY IF ABOVE THE RCS REDLINE. LOSS OF ONE OMS ENGINE
DURING RTLS & TAL WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO PERFORM TIME
CRITICAL PROPELLANT DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2; JSC-20923 PCN-I

































NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s). The Appendix F
identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment Number, NASA















NASA/RI changed criticalities and/or screens for this
failure mode per IOA issue.
NASA/RI added this new FMEA per IOA issue.
NASA/RI added this failure mode to this FMEA per IOA
issue.
NASA/RI added this item to this FMEA per IOA issue.
NASA/RI revised "effects" per IOA issue.
NASA/RI made editorial revisions per IOA issue.
NASA/RI deleted the FMEA for this item and failure mode
per IOA issue.
NASA/RI added a cause to this FMEA per IOA issue.
NASA/RI upgraded this failure mode to an abort





IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to a
CIL item.






IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to an
abort criticality i/i.
IOA recommendsthe addition of this failure mode to the
FMEA/CIL.
IOA recommends the addition of this item and failure mode
to the FMEA/CIL.
IOA recommends editorial revisions on this FMEA.






IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to a
CIL item.
IOA recommends a criticality and/or screen upgrade for
this failure mode.





IOA recommends the addition of this failure mode to the
_4EA/CIL.
IOA recommends the addition of this item and failure mode
to the FMEA/CIL.
IOA recommends editorial revisions on this FMEA.
EPDC 7: IOA recommends that a non-credible failure mode be



























NASA FNEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE / RECONNENDATIONS
............................................................... ° ..................................................
IDENTIFIERS II NASA II lOA RECOMMENDATIONS * I
.......................................... II .................. II ................................................ I
.As, ! Io, 11CmT I SCREENSII CRIT SCREENSJ OTHER ISSUEI
FNEA MLB4BER J ASSESSNENT MIJNBER II ewe I A . C II ewe A B C I (SEE LEGEND COOE) I
.............. I........... II ............ II .......... I...................... I
o3-3-Iom-1 om-loo II 1/1 II /
o.s-+m II 1/1 II /
03-3-1002-1 ONE-102 J[ 2/1R F F P I I 2/1R e F P HDW 4 X
03-3-1002-2 ONE-104 II 3n II /
03-3-1002-3 oMs-103 II 3_ II 3_ .ou + x
03-3-1003-1 oNs-108 II 3/1R p e p II / RES
O.S_09 I1 3/1R P F P 11 / REEl
03-3-1003-2 ONS-107 [[ 2/1R p p p / NDW 7 X
ONS-111 I[ 2/IR P P P 2/IR P F F RES 3, HOW 2, 7 X
03-3-1004-1 0NS-118 [I 3/IR P F P / RES 5
03-3-1004-2 0MS-119 2/IR P P F 2/1R P F F HDW 2 X
0MS-120 2/IR P P F 2/1R P F F HDW 2 X
0NS-121 2/1R P P F 2/1R P F F HDW 2 X
03-3-1004-3 OMS-ZOOI3X 3/2R P F P /
03-3-1006-1 0MS-127 3/3 3/1R P F P HOU 1 X
0MS-128 3/3 3/1R P F P Hi)W 1 X
03-3-1006-2 0N$-126 2/1R P F P /
0NS-130 2/1R P F P / RES 3
03-3-1007-1 0NS-133 3/3 2/1R P F P HOW 1, 7 X
ONS-I_, 3/3 3/1R P F P HDM 1, 7 X
03-3-1007-2 0NS-132 2/1R P F P /
03-3-1007-3 OMS- 136 1/1 / RES 2
03-3-1008-1 0NS-154 313 /
03-3-1009-1 OI4S- 145 1/1 / RES 6
03-3-1009-2 0MS-141 3/1R F NA P /
03-3-1009-3 0MS-142 2/1R P F P / J
0NS-143 2/1R P F P II / RES3
03-3-1009-4 ONS-141A 3/1R P NAP [J /
oNs-ZOO(]4x 3/1R e .A P II / RES 3
03-3-1009-5 0NS-144 II Z/_R p NAe II / RES1
03-311ml O.S-IOS II +/1 II /
ONS-110 II 1/1 II / RES4
0W-116 II 1/1 II /
0MS-122 II 1/1 Ii / RES 4
o.s-lz_ II 1/1 II / RESI.
o.s-135 II 111 II / ess+
Om-I_SA II 111 II / RES+
0MS-155 It 1/1 II / eES 4
03-3-1205-1 0NS-113 J[ 3/1R F F P I[ 3/1R F F P Hl_ 4 X
(_s-lz3 I1 3/1R F F P II 3/1R F F P HOW 4 X
ow-137 II 3/1R F F P II 3/IR F F P HDW 4 X
o.S-l_ II 3/1R F F P [I 3/1R e F P HOV 4 X




NASA FMEATO IOA WORKSHEETCROSSREFERENCE/ RECOMHENDATIONS
.................. , ................. , ............................................ -,? ..............................
IDENTIFIERS II NASA I ZOARECO_ENOATZO.S* I
.......................................... II ................... I................................................ I
NASA
FHEA kI.JMBER


















IOA I I _[T I SCREENS


















I CRIT I SCREENS













































e F p I1 2/1.
F e e I1 2/1.
e e p 11 2/1.
F e F, II 2/1.
e e F, 11 2/1.





















P .AF, II /
F, NAF, II /




F, F, F, II /
F, F, F, II /

















RES 4, HD_ 4






RES 4, l_N 4
HDN 4
RES 4, HDN 4
RES 4, HDN 4
RES 4, 14DN4




























NASA FMEATO IOA MORKSHEETCROSSREFERENCE/ RECOMMENDATIONS
IDENTIFIERS II .ASA II :OA REDOHI4ENDATIONS* I
.......................................... II .................. II ................................................ I
IOA II CRIT J SCREENSII C_IT I SCREENS
ASSESS.e.T_ERIIHWF IA a C IIHWF IA i C
NASA
FI4EANUMBER



































































............ II ..... I......
1/1
2/IR F F P
2/IR F F P
2/1R F F P
2/1R F F P































2/1R P P P
2/1R P P P
Z/1R P P P
2/1R P P P
2/1R P P P
211R P P P
2/1R P P P
II /
II z/Ie F F _'
II 2/IR F F P
II 2/1R e F P
II 2/1R F F P




















































RES 4, _W 4
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APPENDIX F
NASA FMEATO IOA tJORKSHEETCROSSREFERENCE/ RECO4MENDATIONS
ii i ....... Ii II llli JJ ii JJJJ JJ JJ JJllli Ii II II II JJ II JllJllllllllllllJl'l _ ..... !11 .....................................









































































CR]T I SCeEENSII CRIT
.WF I A e c I I"WF
............. II ....
wPPII /
P P P /
P p p /
p F P /
P F P /
P F P /
P F P /
P F P /
P F P /
P F P /
P P P /
P P P /
P P P /
P F P /
P F P /













P P P /
P P P /
P P P /
P NA P /
P P P /
F F P 3/1R
/
3/3
P F P /
P F P /
P P P /
P P P 2/1R
p p p /
P F P /





OTHER I ISSUe I




















RES 9, HOW6, 7
























NASA FMEA TO IOA klORKSNEETCROSSREFERENCE/ RECON4ENDATIONS
IDENTIFIERS NASA I IOA RECOI,PtENDATIONS * I
°°'" ........ "'" ......... "'''''" ..... "" .... ' ' "°'°'='" .......... ' I ....... " ..... "'''" ....... "'''''" ................ I
NASA
FlEA NUqGER



















































HW/F I A S c
=:::l:l:_ :s= :lnnr'.i I:S:m:l: gm::
2/IR P F P
3/1R F F P
3/3
3/3
2/1R F F P
2/1R F F P
2/IR F F P









3/1R P F P
3/1R P F P
3/IR P F P






2/1R P P P
2/1R P P P
2/1R P P P
2/1R P P P
2/1R P P P
2/1R P P P

























I CRIT I SCREENS
I_/F IA _ c
I..... I.......
/
3/1R F F P
/
3/3
2/1R F F P
2/1R F F P
2/1R F F P
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P F P II /
_FPII /
P P P II _/_
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NASA F)_.A TO IOA WORKSHEETCROSSREFERENCE/ RECOHHENDATIONS
NASA
FHEANUHBER
_:llm Bm arllBl_Hrl ------JL-I__--_ _ r.
03-3-6402-1
............................................. ......................................... w...........................
IDENTIFIERS NASA II XOA RECOMMENDATIONS* I
............................................................ II ................................................ J
IOA _IT I SCREENS II CRIT SCREENS
ASSESSNEXTNUHBER I_J/e I A . C 11.WF A B C
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NASA FMEATO IOA WORKSHEETCROSSREFERENCE/ RECOMI4ENDATIONS
NASA
FMEANUMBER
[ ms._ I--_lllr_lB &'l _m_ mlSZ Z
NO_E
ZOENTZFIERS II NASA II ZOARECOMMENDATTONS* I
" ......................................... II .................. II ................................................ I
ze, II CRIT I SCREENSII C_IT I SCREENS OTHER ISSUE]
ASSESSHENTNUMBERI1 eWE I A . C II .WE I A B C (seeLEGEMDCODE) ]



























































































































3/1R P P P
3/1R P P P
3/1R P P P
3/1R P P P
:_/1R P P P



















NASA F'MEA TO lOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE / RECOMMENDATIONS
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